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Abstract
Democratic societies have been increasingly confronted with extreme, knife-edge
election outcomes that affect everybody’s lives and contribute to social instability.
Even if political compromises based on social conventions as equity or economic
arguments as efficiency are available, polarized societies might fail to select them.
We demonstrate that part of the problem might be purely technical and, hence,
potentially solvable. We study different voting methods in three experiments (total
N = 5, 820), including small, medium-sized, and large electorates, and find that
currently-used methods (Plurality Voting and Rank-Order systems) can lead voters
to overwhelmingly support egoistic options. In contrast, alternative, more nuanced
methods (Approval Voting and Borda Count) reduce the support for egoistic options
and favor equity and efficiency, avoiding extreme outcomes. Those methods differ
in whether they favor equity or efficiency when the latter benefits a majority. Our
evidence suggests that targeted changes in the electoral system could favor socially-
desirable compromises and increase social stability.
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1 Introduction
Extreme political outcomes are becoming commonplace. Recent elections around the
globe have produced an increasing number of close, surprising outcomes with long-
ranging consequences, as in the case of the U.K. referendum to leave the European
Union, or several of the most recent U.S. presidential elections. This is commonly seen
as a consequence of the current rise of extremism and polarization in many democratic
societies, be it in terms of the views of individual voters, the strength of partisanship, the
distance between candidate platforms, or the extremism in pursued policies (Abramowitz
and Saunders, 2008; Sunstein, 2009; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Mason, 2015; Boxell
et al., 2017; Martini and Torcal, 2019). Many voters currently view the political process
as confrontational (us vs. them) instead of conceiving of it as the search for political solu-
tions with the potential to benefit a wide majority. This goes so far as to become a threat
even to basic democratic principles (Graham and Svolik, 2020). Electorates might thus
fail to identify alternatives which could serve as compromises and gain widespread social
support, and electoral results might fail to provide clear majorities. This is problematic
because the recognition of the legitimacy of the electoral system, especially among losers,
is crucial for stable governments or resolutions (losers’ consent; Nadeau and Blais, 1993;
Anderson and Mendes, 2006). The consequences can be dire, ranging from social and
political instability and knife-edge, seemingly-random election outcomes to governments
implementing heavily-partisan agendas.
One could hope that morally-rooted options appealing to well-established social con-
ventions would serve to build a wide consensus, identify acceptable compromises, and
construct stable governments. This, however, does not seem to be the case. Social
conventions and appealing political and economic principles do not always succeed in
providing “moral roots” (Haidt, 2008) and facilitating coordination on moderate alter-
natives. Yet, these principles still enjoy generalized support, even in polarized societies,
and have been shown to be important determinants of actual voter behavior (e.g., Fed-
dersen et al., 2009; Fisman et al., 2017; Morton and Ou, 2019). Key among them is
equity (equal treatment of individuals), which underlies many prominent sociopolitical
ideas, from distributive justice to equality of opportunities. For instance, the recent
rise of nationalist parties centered on specific regions of European countries could be
argued to reflect a concentration on self-interest as opposed to equity. Another powerful
idea is efficiency (maximization of joint payoffs), which motivates many uncontroversial
economic arguments from waste avoidance to cost-benefit analysis. For instance, the
Brexit referendum could be conceived as a contest between the overall economic gains of
remaining in a large trade union and the self-centered concerns arising from, e.g., local
job insecurity due to international reallocation of production factors.
Why do widely-accepted, broadly-appealing conventions fail to provide effective coor-
dination devices in the political arena? One aspect of the problem is the voting method.
The requirement that a method should be democratic just means that every voter should
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have the same influence on the political outcome as every other voter. The details of how
ballots look like, and specifically how much information voters can provide, have tradi-
tionally been left to policymakers. Political scientists and social choice theorists have
proposed and studied a number of alternative, theoretically-motivated voting methods
(e.g., Brams and Fishburn, 1978; Saari, 1994), and shown that the choice of one method
or another is highly consequential in at least two ways: first, different methods can
elicit different results from the same electorate (e.g. Riker, 1982; Saari, 1999); second,
the electoral system affects satisfaction with and acceptance of democratic outcomes
(Anderson and Guillory, 1997). For example, using data from UK elections in vari-
ous trade unions, professional associations and non-profit organizations Felsenthal et al.
(1993) and Felsenthal and Machover (1995) found that the outcomes of Plurality Voting
procedures, where each voter must select one candidate only, were inferior, in terms of
several normative criteria, to the outcomes that would have obtained under alternative
methods. A number of field experiments carried out during actual political elections
have shown that alternative voting methods would have resulted in different outcomes,
e.g. in presidential elections in France (Laslier and Van der Straeten, 2008; Baujard
et al., 2014) and in federal and state elections in Germany (Alós-Ferrer and Granić,
2012, 2015). However, little is known so far about the relation between specific methods
and the distributional properties of the outcomes that they favor, and even less is known
about the interaction between voting methods and morally-rooted social conventions.
Consequently, it is important to ask whether and how the voting method itself affects
the results in terms of distributional allocations and whether or not different methods
might facilitate coordination on social conventions.
The question we raise is an empirical one. It is a priori unclear how actual voters
will react to alternative voting methods. While outcome predictions could be derived
theoretically by assuming specific behavior, e.g. sincere voting, it is well-known that
voting methods differ with respect to the degree of strategic behavior that they elicit
(e.g., Van der Straeten et al., 2010). Hence, any comparison across voting methods would
depend on particular, additional behavioral assumptions, which are also hard to verify.
Also, some of the methods considered in the literature (Brams and Fishburn, 1978) do
not allow for point predictions even if sincere voting is assumed. Thus, we carried out
three experiments to examine how voting methods differ when social conventions are
confronted with selfish options.
If extreme political outcomes were exclusively the result of the social evolution of
voter preferences in an increasingly-interconnected world, however, they would simply
be the democratic expression of society’s desires and, independently of the consequences,
remain in the province of political and moral arguments. Our results suggest that this is
not necessarily the case, and in particular that extreme political results might reflect not
only voter preferences, but also the voting method. We illustrate how giving voters more
possibilities to express their preferences can reduce both self-centered voting decisions
and extreme outcomes even when voter preferences are kept constant. The intuition
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is that the outcome of commonly-used methods based on Plurality Voting (and also
Rank-Order methods as used in several countries) mostly depends on the most-preferred
alternatives of each voter, hence disregarding possible compromises. Alternative voting
methods extract more nuanced information from the voters’ preferences and facilitate
coordination on broadly-supported alternatives. Simply put, by relying on the highest-
ranked alternatives only, methods as Plurality Voting lose sight of alternatives which
would be acceptable for a large share of the electorate.
In our experiments, actual human participants made voting decisions (Forsythe et al.,
1993, 1996; Hix et al., 2017) in up to four different, artificially-designed societies following
three different voting methods. Our data further allows to analyze the outcomes under
two additional methods. In our “small electorates” laboratory experiment, each voter
participated in multiple elections in four different experimental societies with six voters
each. We collected 5,400 voting decisions, systematically varying the voting method
for each society. To ensure external validity, we also carried out two large-scale online
experiments, one with “medium electorates” of 30 voters each (and a total of 19,440
additional voting decisions) and another with two “large electorates” of 1,200 voters
each, which replicated the results obtained for small electorates.
In our societies, voters were endowed with (monetarily-induced) preferences and the
alternatives pitted Self-Interest options, which favored specific groups, against social
conventions based on Equity and Efficiency, either separately or jointly. By varying
the consequences of Efficiency for different groups, we also varied the consequences of
inequality and, in particular, whether Efficiency favored a majority or just a minority.
Our societies were polarized in the sense that the opposed groups were equally-sized,
and none of them was close to achieving a majority. To study the effect of the rela-
tive size of the competing interest groups within an electorate, the medium electorates
experiment included an additional asymmetric treatment, which extends our results to
interest groups of different sizes. The three voting methods we considered are Plurality
Voting (PV), Approval Voting (AV),1 and the Borda Count (BC), which are the three
positional voting methods originally described in Riker (1982, Chapter 4E). PV simply
specifies that each voter casts a single vote for a single alternative, mimicking the cru-
cial building block of the most-frequently-used methods in large political elections. AV
allows voters to approve of as many alternatives as they wish, effectively deciding how
many (and which) votes to cast (Brams and Fishburn, 1978, 1988). BC asks voters to
assign points to alternatives, with zero being allocated to their least-preferred option,
one to the second-least preferred, and so on, until n− 1 points are assigned to the most-
preferred one, with n being the number of available alternatives (Saari, 1994, 2000). In
each case, the winner is determined by simple majority (of votes, approvals, or points,
respectively), with ties broken randomly. Additionally, the laboratory experiment in-
1Approval voting is used for municipal elections in the US in Fargo, North Dakota since 2018, and
St. Louis, Missouri since 2020. It is also used various associations (e.g. the Mathematical Association
of America and the American Statistical Association) and by the United Nations to elect the Secretary-
General.
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cluded a preference elicitation task after the voting decisions. Further, we study two
rank-order voting procedures (Single Transferable Vote and the Two-Round System)
using extrapolation based on those elicited preferences (following, e.g., Felsenthal et al.,
1993; Felsenthal and Machover, 1995).
The results are striking. Our evidence shows that currently-favored voting methods,
based on the “one man, one vote” principle (Plurality Voting), exacerbate self-centered
voter behavior and result in outcomes favoring a particular group. Under rank-order
voting methods (as those used in several countries for political elections), results are
even more extreme. In contrast, methods which allow voters to support several options
(Approval Voting) or to provide entire rankings (Borda Count) favor social compromise
in the form of either equity or efficiency. Thus, we demonstrate that part of the problem
underlying extreme political outcomes might be purely technical and, hence, potentially
solvable.
In detail, our empirical findings are that Plurality Voting and Rank-Order methods
create situations where options that favor just a minority win the upper hand in elections
very frequently, while Approval Voting and Borda Count successfully gather support
around socially desirable compromises. Borda Count systematically favors Equity-based
alternatives, while Approval Voting favors Efficiency when inequality is not a concern
(meaning that Efficiency favors a majority), but turns toward Equity when inequality
is a problem (meaning that Efficiency favors only a minority). In the Online Appendix,
we also discuss the consequences for winner’s legitimacy and sincerity (strategic voting),
and provide additional analyses and details. The changes in electoral outcomes are
large and occur in spite of the fact that the electorate’s preferences are kept constant.
That is, the changes occur simply by virtue of the voting method. This is important
because the social roots and causes of polarization are complex and difficult to address
(voters’ preferences, affective issues, etc.), but changing the voting method, within the
parameters given by a democratic society, amounts to a legislative decision, and is hence
a feasible first step.
Our work contributes to the literature which examines the consequences of social
conventions for electoral outcomes. The basic model of rational voting (Downs, 1957)
assumes self-centered motivations, where voters maximize their own payoffs and act
strategically. Strategic voting has indeed been shown to be empirically relevant (e.g.,
Black, 1978; Fisher, 2004) and to vary with voter characteristics (Eggers and Vivyan,
2020). However, both equity and efficiency have been empirically demonstrated to be
key determinants of actual human behavior for distributive decisions (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Bechtel et al., 2018) and
actual voting behavior (Feddersen et al., 2009; Shayo and Harel, 2012; Morton and
Ou, 2019). Linking individual equity-efficiency trade-offs to political decisions during
the 2012 US elections, Fisman et al. (2017) found that the majority of equality-focused
subjects did vote for Barack Obama (and were democrats), indicating that distributional
preferences are a strong motive underlying voting behavior. In a different context,
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distributional concerns related to social conventions (as opposed to self-interest) have
been shown to be important for political participation (voter turnout; see, e.g., Feddersen
and Sandroni, 2006; Fowler, 2006; Fowler and Kam, 2007; Gerber et al., 2008; Gerber and
Rogers, 2009). Given their empirical relevance for individual behavior, social conventions
should have been expected to play a crucial role to hinder extreme outcomes and identify
socially-desirable compromises. Yet, under current electoral systems, there appears to
be little evidence of such a moderating effect at this point.
Some previous works have studied equity-efficiency trade-offs, but have typically
concentrated on a single voting method only. For instance, in a majority-rule voting
game, Bolton and Ockenfels (2006) found twice as many deviations from self-interest
in favor of equity than in favor of efficiency. In contrast, we focus on the interaction
between voting methods and social conventions.
A plethora of voting methods are in use around the world, differing across dimensions
such as how voters express their wishes and how votes are converted into representa-
tion. Accordingly, a strand of the literature has studied and compared different voting
mechanisms, but not with respect to outcome selection and the equity-efficiency trade-
off. Instead, such studies have focused, e.g., on informational efficiency and unequal cost
of voting (strategic abstention) under simultaneous and sequential voting procedures
(Battaglini et al., 2007), or on the comparison of sincerity and strategic behavior across
methods (Bassi, 2015). The contribution of our work is to analyze the relative impor-
tance of different social conventions on voting behavior across voting methods and, in
particular, whether (and if so, for which methods) they can serve as coordination devices
to promote socially-desirable compromises.
2 Experimental Design
In all experiments, subjects were matched into electorates which remained fixed for the
duration of the experiment. Each subject participated in a series of elections, each in
a different voting round. Voting rounds were independent, that is, subjects received no
feedback on the election outcomes or on the decisions of other voters. At the end of
each experiment for each electorate one of the voting rounds was selected at random and
subjects were paid according to the outcome of this round. All payoffs were presented
in terms of Experimental Currency Units (ECU) that were converted to the appropriate
currency at the end of the experiment at a fixed rate.
For each election, preferences over outcomes were induced by conditioning subjects’
payoff on the election outcomes. There were three types of voters, each with a different
monetary reward associated to each of the alternatives. The complete payoff profile
of the electorate was presented on screen in the form of a table. That is, the induced
preferences of all voters within an electorate were publicly known to all voters. We used
four qualitatively different payoff profiles, corresponding to four experimental societies,
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with either four or five alternatives.2 Elections used three different voting methods:
Plurality Voting (PV), Approval Voting (AV), and the Borda Count (BC). Under PV,
voters had to vote for exactly one of the alternatives. Under AV, voters could approve
of as many alternatives as they preferred, but had to approve of at least one alternative
(abstention in the sense of casting the full ballot was allowed). Under BC, voters had
to rank all alternatives by assigning 0 points to their least-preferred alternative, 1 point
to their second-least-preferred alternative and so on with the highest number of points
being assigned to the most-preferred alternative. The winner is the alternative that
received most votes, approvals, or points in total within an electorate, respectively. For
all voting methods ties were broken randomly.3
2.1 Small Electorates
The Small Electorates (SE) experiment consisted of six experimental sessions in the
laboratory with a total of 180 subjects (111 female) who made a total of 5, 400 voting
decisions.4 Subjects were randomly assigned to 30 different small electorates consisting
of six subjects each, two for each type. Each subject took part in 40 elections split into
four blocks of 10 independent elections each. Each block used a different voting method,
which was fixed for all elections in the block. The three main (within-subject) treatments
are PV, AV, and BC, which were used in the first three blocks.5 In the final block all
electorates voted via a random dictator mechanism used for preference elicitation (see
Online Appendix for details).
In Society 1 there were four alternatives available and the payoff profile was sym-
metric across types, that is, the monetary rewards for each type were identical up to
a relabeling of the alternatives. Subjects were randomly assigned a type and cast one
vote for Society 1 in that role. In contrast, Societies 2 to 4 were not symmetric, that is,
the induced preferences over alternatives were qualitatively different across types. There
were three rounds of elections for each of those profiles so that each subject cast exactly
one vote in each role.6 In each block the so-obtained 10 payoff profiles were presented in
a pseudo-randomized order that was the same for each block, which allows for a clean
comparison of voter behavior for a given profile (and type) across voting methods.
2Standard voting experiments typically use a fixed number of alternatives between three and five (see
e.g. Forsythe et al., 1993, 1996; Blais et al., 2016; Hix et al., 2017).
3Figures A.13 and A.15 in the Online Appendix list the normative predictions of the voting methods
for the different societies, assuming sincere voting.
4Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) from a large subject pool consisting mostly
of students. The experiment was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
5Their order was randomized across electorates within a session to eliminate any potential order
effects. At the beginning of each block subjects received a detailed description of the voting method on
screen.
6Subjects did not face the exact same profile three times, but rather three slightly different profiles
that were obtained from the profiles presented in Figures 1.A to 4.A via small random perturbations
(jittering) keeping all its qualitative features unchanged.
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The exchange rate for payoffs was 0.20 EUR for 1 ECU (equivalent to $0.235 at the
time of the experiment). Sessions took on average 70 minutes and subjects received an
average payoff of 13.46 EUR plus an additional show-up fee of 4 EUR.
2.2 Large Electorates.
The laboratory experiment concentrated on small electorates. In actual political elec-
tions, electorates are large and individual decisions are almost negligible. Also, experi-
mental evidence has shown that ethically-motivated alternatives receive larger support
in large elections, since expressive preferences become more important as the likelihood
of being pivotal decreases (Feddersen et al., 2009; Shayo and Harel, 2012). Thus, it is
unclear whether the differences across voting methods that we observe will persist with
large electorates. Hence, it is important to establish the external validity of the results.
For this purpose, we carried out a large-scale experiment in the online-research platform
Prolific (Palan and Schitter, 2018) with two treatments. Each treatment involved 1,200
voters, for a total of 2,400 unique voters (1,593 female).7 We used the payoff profiles of
Societies 3 and 4 in order to show that the results of the SE experiment extend to large
electorates.
In each LE treatment, we assigned 400 voters to each of the three possible types,
magnifying Societies 3 and 4 by a factor of 200. We refer to them as Large Electorate-3
(LE-3) and 4 (LE-4), respectively. Implementation was as in SE, with the exception
that each experiment involved one society only and that each voter was assigned to a
fixed type. That is, in contrast to SE, each LE treatment corresponds to a single, large
election. Voters were aware of the size of the electorate and hence of the fact that, as
in actual elections, their individual vote was practically negligible. In each treatment,
voters cast votes according to all three methods (PV, AV, and BC). The objective was to
show that the results described above transfer to large electorates, in spite of the noisier
environment typical of online experiments.
The exchange rate for payoffs was 0.03 GBP for 1 ECU (equivalent to $0.037 at
the time of the experiment). The experiment took on average 8 minutes and subjects
received an average payoff of 1.95 GBP (about 2.16 EUR at the time of the experiment).
2.3 Medium Electorates.
In SE and LE electorates were symmetric in the sense that they were split into three,
equally-sized interest groups. Although we believe that this captures important features
of polarized societies, it is clear that actual electorates typically are not perfectly sym-
metric. As previous work indicates that group size may affect willingness to compromise
(Posner, 2004; Huber, 2012), it is important to study asymmetric electorates with interest
7Participants were recruited using the online research platform Prolific (Palan and Schitter, 2018)
from a large subject pool consisting of UK residents. The experiment was programmed and conducted
with Qualtrics.
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groups of different sizes. To that end, we conducted an additional Medium Electorates
(ME) online experiment that varied the size of the three interest groups represented
by the different voter types in two between-subject treatments. In each treatment 30
subjects formed a medium-sized electorate and took part in eight elections with five
alternatives. Each election used a different voting method: PV, AV, BC, and the ran-
dom dictator mechanism. Both treatments used the two payoff profiles corresponding
to Societies 3 and 4. In contrast to the SE experiment, subjects were randomly assigned
to a fixed type for each society. In treatment HOM the electorate was symmetric (as
in SE and LE), whereas in treatment HET it was asymmetric (see details below). The
treatments involved 1, 620 voters each, for a total of 3, 240 unique voters (1,985 female)
and 19, 440 voting decisions. We again focused on the payoff profiles of Societies 3 and
4.
The exchange rate for payoffs was as in the LE experiment. The experiment took
on average 10 minutes and subjects received an average payoff of 1.99 GBP (about 2.31
EUR at the time of the experiment).
3 Results
3.1 Small Electorates
To compare voting behavior within and across methods, we measure a voter’s support
for an alternative for a given voting method as follows. For PV, we use a binary variable
indicating whether an alternative was chosen. For AV, we take the normalized approval
score, that is, we normalize approvals by the number of approvals cast by a voter.
For BC, we take a normalized score computed as the number of points assigned to an
alternative divided by the total number of points allocated. For expositional simplicity,
we refer to the resulting measures for all three voting methods as the “level of support”
by a voter for an alternative under a particular voting method. All tests involving the
level of support below are nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests (WSR) conducted
at the individual level (N = 180), with reported p-values corrected for multiple testing
using the Holm-Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979) whenever necessary.
Society 1 pitted egoistical behavior against an equity-based compromise. Figure
1A details the payoffs and induced preferences. There were a total of four alternatives
(labeled neutrally in the experiment). Three of them gave maximal payoff to a single
voter type at the expense of others in society, and hence represented Self-Interest options,
depicted in the table as SI1, SI2, and SI3. We will refer to SIi as the self-interest (SI)
alternative of voters of type i. The fourth option, Equity (Equ), equalized payoffs.
Monetary payoffs (Fig. 1A, top) were such that the induced self-centered preferences for
each type (Fig. 1A, bottom) put the own Self-Interest option on top and the equality-
based alternative second; hence the latter was a morally-attractive compromise for all
voters and a natural focal point for coordination. Self-Interest alternatives and Equity
9
A
Type 1 2 3 ∑
# 2 2 2
SI1 95 55 45 390
SI2 45 95 55 390
SI3 55 45 95 390
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Figure 1: Preferences, voting behavior, and outcomes for Society 1.
Notes: A, Voter preferences in each electorate, induced monetarily. B, Aggregate voting behavior
for the 180 voters. C, Voting outcomes for the 30 electorates, by voting method. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
paid the same total amount to the electorate; hence, there was no difference in terms of
efficiency when comparing Self-Interest to Equity. Types were identical up to a relabeling
of the alternatives and hence the analysis (in terms of whether voters voted for SI or
Equ) does not need to distinguish among them. Each voter participated in Society 1
three times, once per voting method.
Figure 1B displays aggregate voting behavior in Society 1, where SI stands for support
for the own Self Interest option. The support for Self Interest options is significantly
larger than the support for Equity for all three voting methods (all p < 0.001). This
shows a failure of Equity to serve as a “moral root” facilitating coordination. However,
average support for Equity is still substantial, confirming that it represents a socially-
desirable compromise, and it increases from 28.3% under PV to 33.6% under AV and
35.4% under BC. The advantage in the level of support for Self-Interest over Equity
(difference between the variables defined above) is larger under PV than under either
AV or BC (PV vs. AV, p = 0.028; PV vs. BC, p < 0.001). That is, AV and BC mitigate
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Type 1 2 3 ∑
# 2 2 2
SI1 95 55 45 390
SI2 45 95 55 390
SI3 55 45 95 390
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Figure 2: Preferences, voting behavior, and outcomes for Society 2.
Notes: A, Voter preferences in each electorate, induced monetarily. B, Aggregate voting behavior
for the 180 voters. C, Voting outcomes for the 30 electorates, by voting method. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
the focus on Self-Interest, leading to a significant increase in the share of votes received
by Equity.
Figure 1C displays the percentage of the time that an option won the election in
Society 1, with ties broken randomly, across different voting methods. All tests on
voting outcomes below are WSR tests conducted at the electorate level (N = 30), with
p-values corrected using the Holm-Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979) whenever necessary.
The apparently-modest increase in support for Equity has a very large impact on actual
voting outcomes. Under PV, there is a large number of ties (paralleling knife-edge results
in large elections) and the outcome typically favors the self-interest of just one voter
subgroup, with Equity winning only 38.9% of the elections. In contrast, AV implements
Equity in an astounding 74.2% of the elections, significantly more than under PV based
on the number of elections won per electorate (p = 0.012). The results under BC are
even more extreme, with Equity winning almost universally (in 96.7% of the elections),
significantly more often than under PV (p < 0.001) and under AV (p = 0.013).
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Society 2 pitted egoistical behavior against an efficiency-based compromise. The
Self-Interest alternatives were exactly as in Society 1, but the fourth alternative was
an Efficiency (Eff) one which yielded a strictly higher total payoff to the overall elec-
torate (Fig. 2A). The payoff distribution for Efficiency creates inequality, with two types
(four voters) being efficiency winners (EWs) and the remaining type (two voters) being
efficiency losers (ELs). That is, Efficiency benefits a majority of the electorate. EWs
rank Efficiency second, after their own Self-Interest option, while ELs rank Efficiency
last. This profile was also designed to minimize the effect of equity concerns, with no
clear equity-based focal point according to standard theories (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Voters participated in Society 2 three times for each voting
method, and each time they were assigned to a different voter type.
Figure 2B displays aggregate voting behavior in Society 2, distinguishing EWs and
ELs, and focusing on the comparison of SI and Eff. ELs are very close to fully-selfish be-
havior, displaying almost no support for Efficiency in any method (PV: 2.2%, AV: 2.6%,
BC: 5.2%), in particular below their support for Self-Interest (all p < 0.001). However,
the advantage in support for Self-Interest over Efficiency for ELs is significantly larger
for PV than under either AV or BC (both p < 0.001). For EWs, we pool decisions for
types 1 and 2 (since induced preferences were identical up to relabeling of alternatives)
and define their level of support for an alternative as the average across their two de-
cisions made as EW. Their support is split between SI and Efficiency, with the average
support for the former being slightly larger for all three methods (all p < 0.001). That
is, EWs appear to be torn between Efficiency and Self-Interest, while ELs essentially
focus exclusively on Self-Interest although to a lesser extent under AV and BC.
Again, the apparently-small differences in voting behavior across methods are enough
to induce substantial differences in actual voting outcomes (Fig. 2C). PV leads to fre-
quent ties among the Self-Interest alternatives, with Efficiency winning only 33.1% of
the elections. In contrast, under AV the efficient outcome wins 55.0% of the elections,
significantly more than under PV (p = 0.003). Under BC, Efficiency wins 38.3% of
the elections, significantly less often than under AV (p = 0.037), but not significantly
different from PV (p = 0.248). That is, when an Efficiency option favoring a majority
is available (but no Equity option is), AV is more often able to elicit clear majorities for
it, while BC is not.
While Societies 1 and 2 confronted Self-Interest with either Equity or Efficiency in
isolation, in Societies 3 and 4 both social conventions were present (hence five alternatives
were available). Efficiency creates inequality in both societies, but they differ in whether
a majority or just a minority benefits. Society 3 is characterized by a majority of
efficiency winners if Efficiency is selected. This society allows us to study both self-
centered choices and the equity-efficiency trade-off in a situation where a majority of
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Figure 3: Preferences, voting behavior, and outcomes for Society 3.
Notes: A, Voter preferences in each electorate, induced monetarily. B, Aggregate voting behavior
for the 180 voters. C, Voting outcomes for the 30 electorates, by voting method. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Figure 3A details the payoffs and induced preferences in Society 3. Figure 3B sum-
marizes actual aggregate voting behavior. EWs tend to support Efficiency (PV: 37.5%;
AV: 38.1%; BC: 31.7%) over Equity (PV: 8.1%; AV: 11.6%; BC: 21.6%; all three meth-
ods p < 0.001). For ELs, support for Efficiency is virtually nonexistent (PV: 2.8%; AV:
1.9%; BC: 2.3%), and far smaller than their support for Equity (PV: 26.1%; AV: 34.1%;
BC: 29.8%; all three methods p < 0.001). However, for all methods, Self-Interest options
receive a larger support than Efficiency for EWs (PV, p = 0.038; AV, p = 0.007; BC,
p = 0.048), although the difference is small for AV and BC. Self-Interest options also
receive a clearly larger support than Equity for ELs (all three methods p < 0.001).
Again, differences in voting behavior result in considerable differences in voting out-
comes (Fig. 3C). Under PV, SI options win most of the time (54.3%), while under
AV and BC the most-frequent winners are Efficiency (58.2%) and Equity (64.8%), re-
spectively. Efficiency wins most frequently under AV (AV vs. PV, p = 0.002; AV vs.
BC, p < 0.001), and Equity wins most elections under BC, compared to both PV and
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Type 1 2 3 ∑
# 2 2 2
SI1 95 55 45 390
SI2 45 95 55 390
SI3 55 45 95 390
Equ 65 65 65 390
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Figure 4: Preferences, voting behavior, and outcomes for Society 4.
Notes: A, Voter preferences in each electorate, induced monetarily. B, Aggregate voting behavior
for the 180 voters. C, Voting outcomes for the 30 electorates, by voting method. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
AV (both p < 0.001). Equity still fares significantly better under AV than under PV
(p = 0.017). Indeed, under AV SI options only win 18.9% of the elections, and only
9.3% under BC. That is, while Self-Interest often wins the upper hand under PV, each
of the alternative voting methods manages to select a desirable social convention as an
acceptable compromise, which goes on to win most elections. The methods clearly differ,
with AV favoring Efficiency and BC selecting Equity.
Finally, in Society 4 both Equity and Efficiency are available alternatives, but if
Efficiency were implemented a majority of the electorate would be worse off, i.e. there is
a majority of ELs (Fig. 4A). Figure 4B summarizes actual aggregate voting behavior for
Society 4, separately for EWs and ELs. As in Society 3, EWs tend to support Efficiency
(PV: 20.0%; AV: 37.7%; BC: 31.2%) over Equity (PV: 13.3%; AV: 15.4%; BC: 21.6%;
PV, p = 0.121; AV and BC, p < 0.001). For ELs, support for Efficiency (PV: 3.1%; AV:
9.4%; BC: 20.7%) is much smaller than support for Equity (PV: 26.1%; AV: 30.3%; BC:
30.0%; all three methods p < 0.001). Self-Interest options receive a larger support than
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Efficiency for EWs under PV (p < 0.001), but, as in Society 3, the differences are small
under both AV and BC (AV, p = 0.136; BC, p = 0.065). Self-Interest options receive a
clearly larger support than Equity for ELs (all three methods p < 0.001).
Under PV, the average support received by Efficiency from EWs is almost cut in
half in Society 4 (where efficiency benefits only a few) compared to Society 3 (where
efficiency benefits a majority; p < 0.001). Thus, there is a clear “wasted vote” effect
for EWs under PV when they are in the minority, as they realize that their favorite
option has no chance of winning and hence strategically misrepresent their preferences.
This effect is absent under AV (p = 0.557) and BC (p = 0.804). For ELs, support for
Self-Interest and Equity are very similar in Societies 3 and 4. However, Efficiency also
receives some support from ELs under AV (9.4%) and BC (20.7%) in Society 4. This
is likely due to the fact that, compared to Society 3, a larger group of ELs shares the
losses relative to Equity, and in terms of payoffs the comparison of Efficiency and Equity
is less aversive.
Differences in voting outcomes are also large for Society 4 (Fig. 4C). Under PV,
SI options win an overwhelming 70.4% of the time. In contrast, the most-frequent
winner under both AV and BC is Equity (AV, 57.8%; BC, 72.8%), and both select it
significantly more often than PV (both p = 0.001). Since PV mostly selects Self-Interest,
also Efficiency is selected more often under AV (p = 0.002) and BC (p < 0.001). There
is no significant difference in outcomes between AV and BC. That is, on the one hand,
Society 4 confirms the previous observation that Self-Interest wins often under PV but
the other methods manage to shift the balance to desirable conventions. On the other
hand, putting Societies 3 and 4 together we see that BC is non-responsive in the sense
that it favors Equity independently of whether a majority or just a minority benefits
from Efficiency, while AV is highly responsive to the latter distinction, favoring Efficiency
only when the majority profits from it, and shifting support to Equity otherwise.
3.2 Large Electorates
We now look at voting behavior and voting outcomes for both large electorates across
voting methods. Since each LE treatment captured a single election per method, out-
comes correspond to the actual, overall winners. Both average voting behavior and
election outcomes show exactly the same trends in LE as in SE.
For LE-3, under PV, each of the three SI options received more votes (≥ 263) than
either Equity (196) or Efficiency (188), consequently one of the self-interest options (SI3)
won the election. In contrast, under AV both Equity (655) and Efficiency (692) received
more approvals than any SI option (≤ 551), with Efficiency winning the election. Under
BC, again both Equity (2786) and Efficiency (2592) received more points than any SI
option (≤ 2281), and Equity emerged as the winner. That is, while Self-Interest won the
upper hand in LE-3 under PV, each of the alternative voting methods managed to select
a desirable social convention as an acceptable compromise. This reproduces the results
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Figure 5: Aggregate voting behavior for large electorates.
from the laboratory experiment (Society 3) and confirms that the methods clearly differ,
with AV favoring Efficiency and BC selecting Equity.
Figure 5 (left panel) summarizes aggregate voting behavior across voting methods for
LE-3, separately for EWs and ELs. All comparisons are as in the small electorates. EWs
tend to support Efficiency (PV: 19.5%; AV: 30.2%; BC: 26.5%) over Equity (PV: 14.5%;
AV: 17.2%; BC: 21.5%; WSR test, N = 800; PV, p = 0.018; AV and BC, p < 0.001).
For ELs, support for Efficiency is very low (PV: 8.0%; AV: 7.7%; BC: 11.8%), and
in particular lower than their support for Equity (PV: 20.0%; AV: 30.2%; BC: 26.6%;
WSR test, N = 400; all three methods p < 0.001). Self-Interest options receive a larger
support than Efficiency for EWs (all three methods p < 0.001), although the difference
is small for AV and BC. Self-Interest options also receive a clearly larger support than
Equity for ELs (all three methods p < 0.001). In summary, all previous conclusions for
Society 3 hold in a large electorate.
The second treatment (LE-4) reproduced Society 4 for a large electorate. Again,
voting behavior and outcomes paralleled the results from the small electorates, with
large differences in voting margins. Under PV, each of the three SI options received
more votes (≥ 275) than either Equity (249) or Efficiency (98), and consequently one of
the self-interest options (SI3) won the election. In contrast, under AV both Equity (725)
and Efficiency (677) received more approvals than any SI option (≤ 556), and Equity
won the election by a large margin. Under BC, both Equity (2888) and Efficiency (2740)
also received more points than any SI option (≤ 2175), and Equity emerged again as
the winner with a large advantage over SI options. That is, as in the small electorates,
Self-Interest won the upper hand in our large electorate under PV, and both alternative
voting methods selected Equity as an acceptable compromise. On the one hand, LE-4
confirms the previous observation that Self-Interest wins often under PV but the other
methods manage to shift the balance to desirable conventions. On the other hand,
comparing LE-3 and LE-4 confirms the previous comparison between Societies 3 and 4.
BC favors Equity independently of whether a majority or just a minority benefits from
Efficiency, while AV responds to the latter distinction, favoring Efficiency only when the
majority profits from it, and shifting support to Equity otherwise.
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Figure 5 (right panel) summarizes aggregate voting behavior across voting methods
for LE-4, separately for EWs and ELs. Again, EWs tended to support Efficiency (PV:
12.2%; AV: 29.1%; BC: 26.3%) over Equity (PV: 17.0%; AV: 17.5%; BC: 21.0%) under
AV and BC (both p < 0.001), whereas the opposite holds under PV (p = 0.096). For
ELs, support for Efficiency (PV: 6.1%; AV: 16.0%; BC: 21.1%) is much smaller than
support for Equity (PV: 22.6%; AV: 27.1%; BC: 25.6%; all three methods p < 0.001).
Self-Interest options receive a larger support than Efficiency for EWs under PV (p <
0.001); as in LE-3, differences are small under both AV and BC, but remain statistically
significant (AV, p < 0.001; BC, p = 0.001). Self-Interest options receive a clearly larger
support than Equity for ELs (all three methods p < 0.001). All conclusions are as in
Society 4 in the small electorates.
All previous conclusions comparing Societies 3 and 4 are supported for large elec-
torates (the comparison is now between subjects). Under PV, support for Efficiency
from EWs is almost halved in LE-4 compared to LE-3 (Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test, WRS,
N = 1200; PV, p = 0.002), confirming the “wasted vote” effect for EWs under PV
when they are in the minority. This effect is absent under AV and BC, with the EWs’
support for Efficiency being of comparable magnitude in both societies (AV, p = 0.432;
BC, p = 0.474). For ELs, support for Self-Interest and Equity are very similar in both
societies. However, Efficiency also receives larger support from ELs under AV (16.0%)
and BC (21.1%) in LE-4 than in LE-3 (both p < 0.001).
We conclude that the results obtained in our laboratory experiments are not limited
to small electorates. The conclusion that alternative voting methods allow electorates
to successfully coordinate on socially desirable compromises extends to large electorates,
as does the observation that BC favors Equity, while AV supports Efficiency provided a
majority benefits from it.
3.3 Medium (and Asymmetric) Electorates
In the ME experiment, in treatment HOM we assigned 10 voters to each of the three
possible types in Society 3 (HOM-3) and Society 4 (HOM-4). In HET, the distribution
of types was asymmetric. In Society 3 of HET (HET-3), 8 voters were assigned to
type 1, 9 to type 2, and 13 voters to type 3, increasing the size of the minority group
of efficiency losers relative to HOM-3. This asymmetry between voter types in HET-3
affects the efficiency of alternatives in two ways: First, the three Self-Interest alternatives
differ in terms of efficiency with SI1 being the least and SI3 the most efficient of those
alternatives. Second, while Eff remains the efficient compromise in the sense of being
more efficient than Equity, it is now less efficient overall compared to SI3. In Society
4 of HET (HET-4), 9 voters were assigned to type 1, 8 to type 2, and 13 to type 3,
increasing the size of the minority group of efficiency winners relative to HOM-4. As in
HET-3, the three Self-Interest options differ in terms of efficiency, but now SI1 and SI2
17
are the most and least efficient of those alternatives, respectively. In contrast to HET-3,
however, Eff remains the alternative with the highest efficiency overall.
The results of HOM closely replicate all results obtained for Societies 3 and 4 in
SE (see Online Appendix for details), hence we turn to compare HOM and HET. In
HET-3, the electorate was not only asymmetric, but as a consequence of this asymmetry
the advantage in terms of efficiency of the efficient compromise Eff over equity was also
much smaller compared to HOM-3. Although voting behavior is rather similar in both
treatments, the difference in the size of the three interest groups have a clear effect on
voting outcomes in HET-3. Under PV, SI options win almost all elections (92.6%), while
under AV and BC the most-frequent winner is Equity (AV: 60.2%; BC: 76.9%). Under
AV and BC, SI options win only 24.1% and 17.6% of the elections, respectively. That is,
while Self-Interest almost always wins the upper hand under PV, each of the alternative
voting methods manages to select a desirable social convention. In contrast to HOM-3,
AV selects Equity in HET-3, which yields two interesting insights: First, it shows that
AV is also sensitive to whether the efficiency gain is small or large, selecting Efficiency
in HOM-3, where it is large and Equity in HET-3, where it is small. Second, although
in HET-3 alternative SI3 is overall the most efficient option (since voters of type 3 form
the largest interest group), it is not selected by AV.
Next, we consider Society 4. In HET-4, EWs are still a minority but now form the
largest of the three interest groups. Consequently, the efficient compromise Eff is even
more efficient in HET-4 than in HOM-4. Again, there are no large differences in voting
behavior across treatments, however, the same cannot be said about voting outcomes.
Under PV, SI options win an overwhelming 88.6% of the time in HET-4. In contrast,
under both AV and BC Equ emerges as the winner most of the time (AV, 56.5%; BC,
57.4%). As in HOM-4, equity is selected by both AV and BC, however, both methods
react to the overall greater efficiency of Eff by selecting it more frequently in HET-4
than in HOM-4.
In summary, HOM shows that our previous results for small and large electorates
also obtain for medium-sized electorates. A comparison of HOM and HET reveals that
all voting methods react to differences in the size of the interest groups. Under PV, an
asymmetric electorate leads to even more extreme outcomes with selfish options winning
almost all elections. In contrast, AV and BC also allow the asymmetric electorate to
successfully coordinate on socially desirable compromises. For those methods, the asym-
metry merely affects the frequency with which one or the other compromise is selected.
4 Rank-Order Methods
Our experiments focused on the three positional voting methods originally described in
Riker (1982, Chapter 4E): PV, AV, and BC. Naturally, there are many other interesting
voting methods that could have been used as well. Two prominent examples are the
rank-order voting methods Single Transferable Vote (STV), used e.g. for the election
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of the Australian Parliament, and the two-round system (TRS) used in the French
presidential elections. Although those methods were not included in our experiments,
we can use the preference rankings elicited via the random dictator mechanism to infer
the outcomes that would be obtained under those voting procedures by extrapolation
based on those elicited preferences (see Felsenthal et al., 1993; Felsenthal and Machover,
1995, for a similar approach employed in a field setting). In this section we report the
results of this exercise for small and medium electorates, which featured the random
dictator mechanism (the Online Appendix provides further details of these analyses).8
We first consider the induced election outcomes under STV for small electorates.
Voting outcomes exhibit a large number of ties, with self-interest options winning an
overwhelming amount of elections. Across the four societies, equity and efficiency win
only between 5% and 8% of the elections, which suggests that outcomes under STV
(assuming that voters vote according to their elicited preferences) would be even more
extreme than under PV. For small electorates, the outcomes under TRS are exactly
identical.
Turning to the outcomes under STV for medium electorates, we find that ties are less
frequent, probably due to the larger size of the electorates. Nevertheless, self-interest
options still win an overwhelming amount of elections. In HOM-3 and HOM-4, equity
only wins 11% and 20% of the elections, respectively, whereas efficiency never emerges
as the winner. In HET-3 and HET-4, where the type distribution in the electorate is
asymmetric, compromises tend to be selected more often than in HOM. However, they
are still chosen less frequently than under PV.
Given that rank-order methods are often used in actual political elections as an al-
ternative to Plurality Voting, these results are striking. However, the intuition is simple.
Rank-Order methods as STV and TRS employ multiple rounds of ballot counting, with
alternatives which fare poorly in one round being eliminated from the set available in the
next round. Faring poorly, though, is defined as being ranked highest by a small share
of the electorate. Under these methods, self-interest alternatives are almost universally
ranked first in the first round, resulting in a small support for compromises. Hence, the
latter are often eliminated and are simply not available in later rounds. By basing the
elimination criterion on the highest-ranked alternatives, rank-order methods run into
the same problem as PV: the information on which alternatives would be acceptable for
a large share of the electorate is lost.
5 Discussion
We have shown that moving away from current voting systems and toward methods that
give voters more flexible and detailed ways to express their preferences could greatly
8For LE, we conducted a similar exercise based on the preference ranking induced by subjects’ BC
vote. These results are presented in the Online Appendix. Under STV applied to these BC preferences,
all three SI options received more votes than equity and efficiency in the first round and consequently
SI1 and SI3 emerged as the winner in LE-3 and LE-4, respectively. TRS yields very similar results.
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reduce the prevalence of extreme outcomes in actual elections. With these, more flexible
voting methods in place (but not with the ones which are mostly used nowadays), two key,
prominent social conventions, social justice (equity) and efficiency, can help polarized
societies coordinate on desirable compromises.
In our experiments, which include both small electorates in the laboratory as well as
medium and large electorates online, Plurality Voting (and also rank-order methods as
Single Transferable Vote) generally exacerbates egoistic voting, whereas both Approval
Voting and Borda Count partially mitigate it, with large-magnitude effects on election
outcomes. Inequality (as a result of implementing efficiency at the societal level) plays
a large role. Efficiency losers, who get the short end of the stick when the efficient
alternative is implemented, exhibit a higher degree of self-interest and are less sensible
to the voting method. When both Efficiency and Equity are present, efficiency winners
tend to favor Efficiency, whereas efficiency losers tend to favor Equity.
The choice of the method is also consequential. Borda Count tends to favor Equity
over Efficiency independently of whether a majority or just a minority would benefit from
Efficiency. Approval Voting is more reactive: It tends to implement Efficiency only if a
majority of the society benefits from it, shifting to Equity otherwise. This suggests that
Approval Voting might be more sensitive to and better reflect the aggregate preferences
of the electorate in contrast to the Borda Count, which might also affect other dimensions
of voter satisfaction such as losers’ consent.
In our experiments, we have concentrated on societies where several similarly-sized
groups have opposed interests. We believe that this captures important features of po-
larized societies (Posner, 2004; Huber, 2012), for which our results might be especially
relevant. If a dominant group were to constitute a majority with diametrally-opposed
interests to the rest of the society, there is little hope that a compromise will be reached
regardless of the voting method. However, as our asymmetric treatment with medium
electorates shows, equal distributions are not a prerequisite for the results to be rel-
evant. Indeed, we find that under PV an asymmetric electorate leads to even more
extreme outcomes, whereas AV and BC allow the asymmetric electorate to successfully
coordinate on socially desirable outcomes. For the latter two methods, the asymmetry
only determines which but not whether a compromise is selected.
On the other hand, the problem in some societies might not be that the voting method
prevents coordination on a desirable compromise, but rather that a compromise is not
available among the alternatives to begin with. In this latter case, there is little hope that
changing the voting method will change the result. However, it is conceivable that the
nonexistence of compromises might sometimes be a consequence of the expectation that,
under existing voting methods, putting such options forward is fruitless, for instance
because such attempts have been seen to fail in the past. Thus, changing the voting
method might result in appropriate compromises arising.
Overall, our results suggest that some extreme outcomes in elections might partly
be a consequence of the limitations of the voting methods currently in place, and not
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only of underlying social tendencies. While social science has little to say about the
latter (in the sense that voters are entitled to their true preferences), it has a lot to
contribute to the former. If a faithful, descriptive representation of voters’ preferences
is among the main objectives of a voting method, then those based on Plurality Voting
are doing a poor job of it. In doing so, they are also failing to provide clear majorities,
identify stable social compromises, and ensure the legitimacy of the winners. Democratic
societies might benefit from moving beyond currently-employed methods toward other,
more nuanced ones capable of better eliciting preferences from voters and, especially,
identifying acceptable social compromises. We have concentrated on two prominent
methods, and found both to be an improvement over Plurality Voting and rank-order
methods in this sense. A discussion can be started on the virtues of one or the other
(or a third one), and our work already contributes to that. In terms of which social
convention is favored, our data suggests that Approval Voting might be more responsive
to the well-being of the majority, and seems to better elicit sincere voting behavior (see
Online Appendix). However, choosing among methods should be viewed as a second-
order consideration compared to the social urgency surrounding the potential negative
consequences of rising extremism, and the fact that a purely methodological (legislative)
change could greatly (and immediately) curtail them.
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Alós-Ferrer, C. and D.-G. Granić (2015). Political Space Representation with Approval
Data: The German Experience. Electoral Studies 39 (1), 56–71.
Alvarez, R. M. and J. Nagler (2000). A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting
in Multiparty Elections. British Journal of Political Science 30 (1), 57–75.
Anderson, C. J. and C. A. Guillory (1997). Political Institutions and Satisfaction
with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems.
American Political Science Review 91 (1), 66–81.
Anderson, C. J. and S. M. Mendes (2006). Learning to Lose: Election Outcomes, Demo-
cratic Experience and Political Protest Potential. British Journal of Political Sci-
ence 36 (1), 91–111.
21
Bassi, A. (2015). Voting Systems and Strategic Manipulation: An Experimental Study.
Journal of Theoretical Politics 27 (1), 58–85.
Battaglini, M., R. Morton, and T. Palfrey (2007). Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of
Voting Mechanisms. American Political Science Review 101 (3), 409–424.
Baujard, A., H. Igersheim, I. Lebon, F. Gavrel, and J.-F. Laslier (2014). Who’s Favored
by Evaluative Voting? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential
Election. Electoral Studies 34, 131–145.
Bechtel, M. M., R. Liesch, and K. F. Scheve (2018). Inequality and Redistribution Behav-
ior in a Give-or-Take Game. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115 (14),
3611–3616.
Black, J. H. (1978). The Multicandidate Calculus of Voting: Application to Canadian
Federal Elections. American Journal of Political Science 22 (3), 609–638.
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Appendix A Medium (and Asymmetric) Electorates
We conducted an online experiment with medium electorates that varied the size of
the three groups with different types of voters. In treatment HOM the electorate was
symmetric (as in SE and ME), whereas in treatment HET the electorate was asymmetric.
The treatments involved 1, 620 voters each, for a total of 3, 240 unique voters. We again
focused on the payoff profiles of Societies 3 and 4.
In each treatment, voters were randomly assigned to electorates of 30 voters each. In
HOM, we assigned 10 voters to each of the three possible types in each Society. In HET,
the distribution of types was asymmetric. In Society 3 (HET-3), 8 voters were assigned
to type 1, 9 to type 2, and 13 voters to type 3, increasing the size of the minority group
of efficiency losers relative to HOM-3. This asymmetry between voter types in HET-3
affects the efficiency of alternatives in two ways: First, the three Self-Interest alternatives
differ in terms of efficiency with SI1 being the least and SI3 the most efficient of those
alternatives. Second, while Eff remains the efficient compromise in the sense of being
more efficient than Equity, it is now less efficient overall compared to SI3. In Society
4 (HET-4), 9 voters were assigned to type 1, 8 to type 2, and 13 to type 3, increasing
the size of the minority group of efficiency winners relative to HOM-4. As in HET-3,
the three Self-Interest options now differ in terms of efficiency, but now SI1 is the most
and SI2 is the least efficient of those alternatives. In contrast to Society 3, however, Eff
remains the alternative with the highest efficiency overall. Implementation was as in the
laboratory, with the exception that each voter was assigned to a fixed type.
We first consider HOM, where electorates were symmetric. Figure A.1A details the
payoffs and induced preferences in Society 3 for HOM. Figure A.1B summarizes actual
aggregate voting behavior. EWs tend to support Efficiency (PV: 21.9%; AV: 31.1%;
BC: 27.3%) over Equity (PV: 5.7%; AV: 11.8%; BC: 21.2%; PV, p = 0.005; AV and
BC, p < 0.001). For ELs, support for Efficiency is virtually nonexistent (PV: 4.8%; AV:
6.5%; BC: 9.9%), and far smaller than their support for Equity (PV: 25.0%; AV: 30.9%;
BC: 26.6%; all three methods p < 0.001). However, for all methods, Self-Interest options
receive a larger support than Efficiency for EWs (all three methods p < 0.001), although
the difference is small for AV and BC. Self-Interest options also receive a clearly larger
support than Equity for ELs (all three methods p < 0.001).
Those differences in voting behavior result in considerable differences in voting out-
comes (Fig. A.1C). Under PV, SI options win most of the time (66.0%), while under AV
the most-frequent winner is Efficiency (51.9%) and under BC the most frequent winner
is Equity (76.9%). Efficiency wins most frequently under AV, compared to both PV and
BC (WSR tests, N = 54; both p < 0.001), and Equity wins most elections under BC
(BC vs. PV, p < 0.001; BC vs. AV, p = 0.002). Equity still fares significantly better
under AV than under PV (p = 0.008). Indeed, under AV SI options only win 1.9% of
the elections, and only 2.8% under BC. That is, while Self-Interest often wins the upper
hand under PV, each of the alternative voting methods manages to select a desirable
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Type 1 2 3 ∑
# 10 10 10
SI1 95 55 45 1950
SI2 45 95 55 1950
SI3 55 45 95 1950
Equ 65 65 65 1950
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Figure A.1: Preferences, voting behavior, and outcomes for HOM-3.
Notes: A, Voter preferences per electorate, induced monetarily. B, Aggregate voting behavior
for the 1,620 voters. C, Voting outcomes for the 54 electorates, by voting method. ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
social convention as an acceptable compromise, which goes on to win most elections.
The methods clearly differ, with AV favoring Efficiency and BC selecting Equity.
We now turn to Society 4 in HOM. Payoffs and induced preferences are shown in Fig.
A.2A). Figure A.2B summarizes actual aggregate voting behavior for Society 4. EWs
tend to support Equity over Efficiency under PV (Equ 21.7%, Eff 14.1%, p = 0.003),
whereas they tend to support Efficiency over Equity under AV (Equ 20.8%, Eff 30.0%,
p < 0.001) and BC (Equ 22.6%, Eff 26.4%, p < 0.001). For ELs, support for Efficiency
(PV: 4.0%; AV: 13.3%; BC: 20.4%) is much smaller than support for Equity (PV: 25.0%;
AV: 30.7%; BC: 27.0%; all three methods p < 0.001). For EWs, Self-Interest options
receive a larger support than Equity under PV (p < 0.001) and also a larger support
than Efficiency under AV and BC (both methods p < 0.001), although the difference is
small for AV and BC. Self-Interest options receive a clearly larger support than Equity
for ELs (all three methods p < 0.001).
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Type 1 2 3 ∑
# 10 10 10
SI1 95 55 45 1950
SI2 45 95 55 1950
SI3 55 45 95 1950
Equ 65 65 65 1950
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Figure A.2: Preferences, voting behavior, and outcomes for HOM-4.
Notes: A, Voter preferences per electorate, induced monetarily. B, Aggregate voting behavior
for the 1,620 voters. C, Voting outcomes for the 54 electorates, by voting method. ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Under PV, the average support received by Efficiency from EWs is almost cut in
half in Society 4 (where efficiency benefits only a few) compared to Society 3 (where
efficiency benefits a majority). That is, we again observe a clear “wasted vote” effect
for EWs under PV when they are in the minority. This effect is absent under AV (Soc.
3: 31.1%, Soc. 4: 30.0%) and BC (Soc. 3: 27.3%, Soc. 4: 26.4%). For ELs, support
for Self-Interest and Equity are very similar in Societies 3 and 4. However, Efficiency
also receives some support from ELs under AV (13.3%) and BC (20.4%) in Society 4, as
observed previously for small electorates.
Differences in voting outcomes are also large for Society 4 (Fig. A.2C). Under PV,
SI options win an overwhelming 65.1% of the time. In contrast, under both AV and BC
Equity emerges as the winner in almost all elections (AV, 87.0%; BC, 92.6%), and both
select it significantly more often than PV (N = 54; both p < 0.001). Since PV never
selects Efficiency, it also is selected (marginally) more often under AV (p = 0.051) and
BC (p = 0.043). There is no significant difference in outcomes between AV and BC. In
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Type 1 2 3 ∑
# 8 9 13
SI1 95 55 45 1840
SI2 45 95 55 1930
SI3 55 45 95 2080
Equ 65 65 65 1950
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Figure A.3: Preferences, voting behavior, and voting outcomes for HET-3.
Notes: A, Voter preferences per electorate, induced monetarily. B, Aggregate voting behavior
for the 1,620 voters. C, Voting outcomes for the 54 electorates, by voting method. ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
summary, HOM confirms the results on voting outcomes obtained previously for small
electorates.
Next, we turn to HET where electorates were asymmetric. Figure A.3A details the
payoffs and induced preferences in Society 3 for HET. Figure A.3B summarizes actual
aggregate voting behavior. EWs tend to support Efficiency (PV: 20.8%; AV: 29.7%; BC:
26.4%) over Equity (PV: 14.7%; AV: 18.3%; BC: 21.3%; N = 918, PV, p = 0.002; AV
and BC, p < 0.001). For ELs, support for Efficiency is virtually nonexistent (PV: 3.7%;
AV: 6.9%; BC: 9.8%), and far smaller than their support for Equity (PV: 17.1%; AV:
28.1%; BC: 26.4%; N = 702, all three methods p < 0.001). However, for all methods,
Self-Interest options receive a larger support than Efficiency for EWs (all three methods
p < 0.001), although the difference is small for AV and BC. Self-Interest options also
receive a clearly larger support than Equity for ELs (all three methods p < 0.001).
Those differences in voting behavior result in considerable differences in voting out-
comes (Fig. A.3C). Under PV, SI options win almost all elections (92.6%), while under
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Type 1 2 3 ∑
# 9 8 13
SI1 95 55 45 2080
SI2 45 95 55 1840
SI3 55 45 95 1930
Equ 65 65 65 1950
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Figure A.4: Preferences, voting behavior, and voting outcomes for HET-4.
Notes: A, Voter preferences per electorate, induced monetarily. B, Aggregate voting behavior
for the 1,620 voters. C, Voting outcomes for the 54 electorates, by voting method. ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
AV and BC the most-frequent winner is Equity (AV: 60.2%; BC: 76.9%). Efficiency wins
more frequently under AV compared to both PV and BC (WSR tests, N = 54: AV vs.
PV p = 0.013; AV vs. BC p = 0.049), and Equity wins most elections under AV and BC
(BC vs. PV, p < 0.001; AV vs. PV, p < 0.001) with no significant difference between
AV and BC (p = 0.066). Under AV SI options win 24.1% of the elections, and 17.6%
under BC. That is, while Self-Interest almost always wins the upper hand under PV,
each of the alternative voting methods manages to select a desirable social convention
as an acceptable compromise, which goes on to win most elections. In contrast to HOM,
here both AV and BC select Equity.
Finally, we consider Society 4 in HET. Payoffs and induced preferences are shown in
Fig. A.4A). Figure A.4B summarizes actual aggregate voting behavior for Society 4. For
EWs, there is no difference in support between Equity and Efficiency under PV (Equ
15.1%, Eff 13.1%, p = 0.320), whereas EWs tend to support Efficiency over Equity under
AV (Equ 18.1%, Eff 29.6%, p < 0.001) and BC (Equ 21.2%, Eff 26.1%, p < 0.001). For
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ELs, support for Efficiency (PV: 5.1%; AV: 14.2%; BC: 20.7%) is much smaller than
support for Equity (PV: 23.6%; AV: 27.8%; BC: 25.6%; all three methods p < 0.001).
For EWs, Self-Interest options receive a larger support than Equity under PV (p < 0.001)
and also a larger support than Efficiency under AV and BC (both methods p < 0.001),
although the difference is small for AV and BC. Self-Interest options receive a clearly
larger support than Equity for ELs (all three methods p < 0.001).
Under PV, the average support received by Efficiency from EWs is almost cut in
half in Society 4 (where efficiency benefits only a few) compared to Society 3 (where
efficiency benefits a majority). That is, we again observe a clear “wasted vote” effect
for EWs under PV when they are in the minority. This effect is absent under AV (Soc.
3: 29.7%, Soc. 4: 29.6%) and BC (Soc. 3: 26.7%, Soc. 4: 26.1%). For ELs, support for
Self-Interest and Equity are very similar in Societies 3 and 4. However, again Efficiency
receives some support from ELs under AV (14.2%) and BC (20.7%) in Society 4.
Differences in voting outcomes are also large for Society 4 in HET (Fig. A.4C). Under
PV, SI options win an overwhelming 88.6% of the time. In contrast, under both AV and
BC Equity emerges as the winner most of the time (AV, 56.5%; BC, 57.4%), and both
select it significantly more often than PV (N = 54; both p < 0.001). Since PV almost
never selects Efficiency, it is also selected more often under AV and BC (both p < 0.001).
There is no significant difference in outcomes between AV and BC. In summary, also
HET confirms the results on voting outcomes obtained previously for small electorates.
Appendix B Legitimacy of the Winner
The recognition of the legitimacy of the winner in an electoral system is crucial for
stable governments or resolutions (Nadeau and Blais, 1993; Anderson and Mendes, 2006).
Thus, besides the question of which alternative is selected by a voting method in a
given environment, it is also important to study the legitimacy of the winner. For a
given voting method, we define legitimacy of an alternative as the average proportion
of votes/approvals/points of the alternative, conditional on being the winner, relative
to the maximum number of votes/approvals/points an alternative can obtain. That is,
legitimacy of an alternative is 0% if no voter voted for/approved of that alternative or if
all voters ranked it last. Conversely, legitimacy is 100% if all voters voted for/approved
of that alternative or if all voters ranked it first.
To compare legitimacy, we focus on the most-frequent winner for each society and
experiment/treatment summarized in Table A.1. There are two important insights:
First, legitimacy is smaller the larger the electorate for all voting methods. Average
legitimacy across treatments in SE is highest, with 40.1% for PV, 68.0% for AV, and
66.8% for BC. In comparison, for the medium electorates legitimacy drops to 32.7%
for PV, 63.0% for AV, and 61.5% for BC. Legitimacy is lowest for large electorates
amounting to 24.4% for PV, 59.1% for AV, and 59.1% for BC. Second, legitimacy is low
for PV, whereas it is high for both AV and BC. For PV, legitimacy ranges from 24.8%
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Table A.1: Legitimacy of the winner (in percent).
Most frequent winner (Legitimacy)
PV AV BC
SE Soc. 1 Equ (44.4) Equ (75.0) Equ (71.8)
Soc. 2 Eff (40.5) Eff (65.8) Eff (61.1)
Soc. 3 Eff (38.7) Eff (61.6) Equ (63.8)
Soc. 4 SI1 (36.8) Equ (69.6) Equ (70.5)
ME HOM Soc. 3 SI3 (29.4) Eff (59.9) Equ (59.9)
Soc. 4 Equ (30.8) Equ (67.6) Equ (64.3)
HET Soc. 3 SI3 (36.2) Equ (61.0) Equ (59.9)
Soc. 4 SI3 (34.3) Equ (63.4) Equ (61.8)
LE Soc. 3 SI3 (24.0) Eff (57.7) Equ (58.0)
Soc. 4 SI3 (24.8) Equ (60.4) Equ (60.2)
to 44.4% across treatments and experiments, in particular, the legitimacy of the most-
frequent winner is always well below 50%. In contrast, for AV and BC legitimacy ranges
from 57.7% to 75.0% and from 58.0% to 71.8%, respectively. That is, in all treatments
legitimacy of the most-frequent winner is well above 50% for both AV and BC.9
Appendix C Sincerity
One of the main objectives of a voting method is to represent the electorate’s prefer-
ences as faithfully as possible (e.g., Riker, 1982). Theoretical results have shown that
any voting method within a wide family creates incentives to misrepresent preferences
for strategic reasons (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975), and empirical evidence sug-
gests that strategic voting is frequent in political elections (e.g., Black, 1978; Alvarez and
Nagler, 2000; Fisher, 2004; Eggers and Vivyan, 2020). For instance, strategic considera-
tions lead to the wasted-vote effect where favorite candidates thought to be unlikely to
win are abandoned in favor of popular ones, which might ultimately lead to a reduction
in the number of parties (Duverger, 1954). Although one can argue whether or not ma-
nipulation attempts at the individual level should be a concern (Dowding and van Hees,
2008), it is still important to know which methods elicit a higher degree of strategic
behavior in actual voting decisions. In this section we take a closer look at strategic
voting and the sincerity of voters’ behavior in our data.
Differences in strategic voting across methods are especially interesting in our ex-
perimental setting, because Approval Voting does not belong to the class covered by
the formal results of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) and at least partially
9In the first municipal election under AV in Fargo, North Dakota, in June 2020, both of the elected
candidates received more than 50% approvals by voters. In the last municipal elections before the
introduction of AV in St. Louis, Missouri, the winner received only 32% of the vote; in contrast, in
March 2021, under AV, the winner received 57% of approvals (and became the city’s first Black woman
mayor) (Alley Peña, 2021).
32
escapes them (Brams and Fishburn, 1978; Alós-Ferrer and Buckenmaier, 2019). The in-
tuition is that, even if there are strategic reasons to approve of a non-favorite option, this
can be accomplished by merely moving the approval threshold without misrepresenting
preferences (see, however, Niemi, 1984).
In our experimental societies, we induced preferences via monetary payoffs. The
behavioral literature mostly considers sincerity with respect to the preferences induced
in this way. However, a large literature in economics and political science shows that
preferences take into account both inequality and efficiency (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Feddersen et al., 2009; Bechtel
et al., 2018; Morton and Ou, 2019). Hence, our voters’ true preferences may differ from
monetarily-induced ones. Since our experimental setup focuses on social conventions, it
is likely that non-egoistic motives play a role. For that reason, our laboratory experiment
implemented a novel preference-elicitation method (presented as a fourth voting method)
based on a random dictator mechanism. To that end, subjects were first asked to
choose an alternative that, in case the subject was randomly selected to be the dictator,
would be implemented independently of the decisions of the other voters in the group.
In order to elicit the full preference over alternatives and not just the most-preferred
alternative, subjects were informed that for each alternative there was a small probability
of 5% that this alternative could not be implemented. Hence, subjects were asked to
name a second alternative to be implemented in case their first choice was not feasible.
Continuing in that fashion subjects had to sequentially provide a complete ranking of the
alternatives. Payment for this method was implemented truthfully, that is, a voter was
randomly selected and the most-preferred alternative of this voter was implemented with
a probability of 95%, and eliminated from the ranking otherwise; in the latter case, the
procedure was repeated with the reduced ranking. This method elicits preferences in an
incentive-compatible way, with incentives being fully independent from the decisions of
the other voters. We refer to the ranking so obtained as a subject’s elicited preferences.
By construction Self-Interest is always the most preferred alternative according to
voters’ induced preferences. A small but still sizable fraction of voters prefers one of
the social conventions, Equity (11-13%) or Efficiency (10-17%), to implementing their
payoff-maximizing alternative at least once according to their elicited preferences (Fig.
A.5). For those voters, the induced preference profile does not always coincide with their
preferences as revealed by the elicitation mechanism. Thus we obtain a novel measure
of sincerity. We refer to the classic notion of sincerity relative to the induced preferences
as induced sincerity, and to our alternative measure of sincerity relative to the elicited
preferences as elicited sincerity. Specifically, we define sincerity (induced or elicited)
over a set of alternatives as follows. For PV, the only sincere vote is to vote for the
most-preferred alternative. For AV, a ballot is sincere if it approves of any alternative
that is (strictly) preferred to some approved alternative. For BC, the only sincere vote
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Figure A.5: Elicited preferences for small electorates.
Notes: Fraction of subjects who favor Equity or Efficiency over Self-Interest at least once, ac-
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Figure A.6: Induced and elicited sincere votes for small electorates.
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Figure A.7: Induced sincere votes for large electorates.
Notes: Fraction of induced sincere votes for each voting method for large electorates.
Focusing on elicited sincerity, we find a large fraction of insincere votes under PV,
except for efficiency losers in Society 2 (Fig. A.6). In contrast, we find high levels of
sincerity under AV and no systematic difference in sincerity between EWs and ELs (WSR
tests, N = 180; Soc. 2, p = 0.046; Soc. 3, p = 0.056; Soc. 4, p = 0.360). Under BC
there is also a large fraction of insincere votes, with a stronger tendency toward strategic
voting for EWs compared to ELs (Soc. 2, p < 0.001; Soc. 3, p = 0.078; Soc. 4, p = 0.003).
However, for BC sincerity is a very demanding concept, as it requires subjects to truly
state their complete preference ranking and not just the top-ranked one as it is the case
for PV. Given this, the fact that sincerity in BC is of a similar magnitude than in PV
means that BC did not exacerbate insincerity in our data. Interestingly, voters in the
minority show more strategic voting under BC compared to PV (Soc. 2, ELs, p < 0.001;
Soc. 3, ELs, p = 0.003; Soc. 4, EWs, p = 0.001), while the majority shows no such effect
(Soc. 2, EWs, p = 0.471; Soc. 3, EWs, p = 0.138; Soc. 4, ELs, p = 0.073). We also
find that the overall level of sincerity is qualitatively the same with respect to both the
induced and the elicited preferences (17 out of 21 tests are insignificant).
For large electorates, we can also examine induced sincerity. Overall sincerity seems
to be lower than in the laboratory. However, the relative magnitudes of sincerity across
voting methods and EW/EL are again very similar. We find a large fraction of insincere
votes under PV (Fig. A.7) with a stronger tendency toward strategic voting for EWs
compared to ELs in LE-3 (WRS test, N = 1200, p = 0.020). In contrast, we find high
levels of sincerity under AV and no systematic difference in sincerity between EWs and
ELs (WRS tests, N = 1200; LE-3, p = 0.643; LE-4, p = 1.000). Under BC there is also
a large fraction of insincere votes and no difference between EWs and ELs (WRS tests,
N = 1200; LE-3, p = 1.000; LE-4, p = 0.935).
The ME experiment also featured our preference-elicitation method, hence, we can
consider both induced and elicited sincerity. A small but still sizable fraction of voters
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Figure A.8: Elicited preferences in medium electorates.
Notes: Fraction of subjects who favor Equity or Efficiency over Self-Interest at least once, ac-
cording to their elicited preferences.
plementing their payoff-maximizing alternative at least once according to their elicited
preferences (Fig. A.8).
Focusing on elicited sincerity, we find a large fraction of insincere votes under PV,
except for efficiency losers in HET-3 (Fig. A.9). In contrast, we find high levels of
sincerity under AV and no systematic difference in sincerity between EWs and ELs
except for HET-3 (MWU tests, N = 1620; HOM-3, p = 0.369; HOM-4, p = 0.232; HET-
3, p = 0.016; HET-4, p = 0.117;). Under BC there is also a large fraction of insincere
votes, with no difference in strategic voting between EWs and ELs for HOM (HOM-3,
p = 0.273; HOM-4, p = 0.359). However, in HET there is a stronger tendency toward
strategic voting for EWs compared to ELs in Society 3 (HET-3, p = 0.003), whereas we
find the opposite for Society 4 (HET-4, p < 0.001).
Comparing elicited sincerity to induced sincerity, we find that sincerity tends to be
higher with respect to the elicited preferences compared to the induced preferences for
PV (5 out of 8 tests significant). For AV, we find that the overall level of sincerity
is qualitatively the same with respect to both the induced and the elicited preferences
(7 out of 8 tests are insignificant). For BC, induced sincerity tends to be higher than
elicited sincerity (6 out of 8 tests significant).
Appendix D Rank-Order Methods
Extrapolation based on elicited preference ranking
In this section, we use the preference rankings elicited via the random dictator mech-
anism to infer the outcomes that would be obtained under other voting procedures
by extrapolation based on their elicited preference (an analogue analysis based on the
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Figure A.9: Induced and elicited sincere votes.
Notes: Fraction of induced/elicited sincere votes for each voting method for medium electorates.
rank-order method Single Transferable Vote (STV) and the two-round system (TRS)
used in the French presidential elections.
Under STV, there are multiple rounds of ballot counts. In the first round, only the
alternatives that are ranked first are counted. If an alternative receives an absolute
majority, it is declared the winner. Otherwise, the alternatives that are ranked first
by the fewest voters are eliminated from all the ballots. In the second round, only the
alternatives that are now (after elimination) ranked first are counted. If an alternative
receives an absolute majority, it is declared the winner. This procedure is repeated until
there is an alternative that receives an absolute majority or several alternatives are tied
with the highest proportion of votes. Ties are broken randomly.
Figure A.10 shows the induced election outcomes for small electorates under STV.
Voting outcomes exhibit a large number of ties, with self-interest options winning an
overwhelming amount of elections. In Society 1, equity wins only 12% of the elections
with the remaining elections going to self-interest alternatives. In Society 2, efficiency
performs even worse, winning only 8% of the elections. In Society 3, the outcomes almost
always go in favor of self-interested options with each of equity and efficiency winning
only 3% of the elections. In Society 4, efficiency never emerges as the winner, whereas



















































































































































































































Figure A.10: Voting outcomes under single transferable vote for small electorates.
Notes: Actual voting outcomes for the 30 small electorates under single transferable vote based
























































































































































































































Figure A.11: Voting outcomes under single transferable vote for HOM and HET.
Notes: Actual voting outcomes for the 30 small electorates under single transferable vote based
on subjects elicited preferences with ties split randomly.
outcomes under STV (assuming that voters vote according to their elicited preferences)
would be even more extreme than under PV.
Figure A.11 shows the induced election outcomes for medium electorates (HOM
and HET) under STV. Electorates are larger than in SE and, hence, ties are much
less frequent. Nevertheless, self-interest options still win an overwhelming amount of
elections. In HOM-3, the outcomes almost always go in favor of self-interested options
with equity winning only 11% of the elections and efficiency not winning a single one. In
HOM-4 the picture is not much different: again efficiency never emerges as the winner,
whereas equity wins 20% of the elections. In HET-3, the self-interest options favoring the
largest group of voters wins most elections with equity and efficiency winning only 16%
and 9% of the elections, respectively. A similar picture emerges for HET-4, here, however,
equity wins 31% of the elections, whereas efficiency wins almost no elections (2%). Thus,
in HET, where the type distribution in the electorate is asymmetric, compromises tend
to be selected more often than in HOM.
Summarizing, our results suggest that the outcomes under STV (assuming that voters

























































































































































































































Figure A.12: Voting outcomes under single transferable vote for medium electorates
(HOM and HET).
Notes: Actual voting outcomes for the 54 electorates in HOM and the 54 electorates in HET
under Single Transferable Vote based on subjects BC rankings with ties split randomly.
Under the two-round system (TRS), voters participate in two rounds of plurality
voting. The two candidates that receive the most votes in the first round participate in
a second runoff plurality vote. The candidate that receives the majority of votes in the
second round is declared the winner. For small electorates, the voting outcomes under
TRS turn out to be exactly the same as the ones obtained under STV, presented in
Figure A.10. For medium electorates (HOM and HET), equity and efficiency win even
slightly less often but otherwise the results are also very similar to those under STV
presented in Figure A.11.
Extrapolation based on Borda Count ranking
In this section, we apply the procedure outlined in the previous section to the ranking
elicited under BC to infer the outcomes under STV and TRS. This allows us to apply the
same procedure also to the large electorate experiment where the preference elicitation
via the random dictator mechanism was not included.
For LE-3, in the first round of STV the three self-interest options were ranked first
by 280, 284, and 295 voters respectively, whereas equity received 141 votes and efficiency
received 200 votes. Consequently, equity is eliminated in the first round. In the sec-
ond round, the three self-interest options receive 297, 309, and 338 votes, respectively,
whereas efficiency is ranked first by 256 voters. Hence, efficiency is eliminated in the
second round, and completing the procedure SI1 emerges as the winner. For LE-4, in
the first round of STV the three self-interest options were ranked first by 289, 306, and
317 voters respectively, whereas equity received 152 votes and efficiency received 136
votes. Consequently, efficiency is eliminated first. In the second round, the three self-
interest options receive 318, 324, and 347 votes, respectively, whereas equity is ranked
first by 211 voters. Hence, equity is eliminated in the second round, and completing the
procedure SI3 emerges as the winner.
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Next, we consider the two-round system (TRS). For LE-3, in the first round of TRS
the three self-interest options were ranked first by 280, 284, and 295 voters, respectively,
whereas equity received 141 votes and efficiency received 200 votes. Consequently, SI2
and SI3 participate in the runoff. In the second round, SI3 wins with 702 to 498 votes.
For LE-4, a very similar picture emerges. Again SI2 and SI3 participate in the second
round runoff, and again SI3 emerges as the winner with 710 to 490 votes.
Appendix E Predicted Outcomes
In this section, we provide the predicted outcomes assuming voters vote sincerely ac-
cording to their induced preferences. Figures A.13 and A.14 summarize the results of
sincere voting for Societies 1–4 in SE. The predictions for LE and treatment HOM of
ME are identical. Figure A.15 summarizes the results of sincere voting for Societies 3
and 4 in treatment HET of ME.
Society 1
Type 1 2 3

















SI1 2 0 0 2
SI2 0 2 0 2
SI3 0 0 2 2
Equ 0 0 0 0
AV2
SI1 2 0 0 2
SI2 0 2 0 2
SI3 0 0 2 2
Equ 2 2 2 6
AV3
SI1 2 2 0 4
SI2 0 2 2 4
SI3 2 0 2 4
Equ 2 2 2 6
BC
SI1 6 2 0 8
SI2 0 6 2 8
SI3 2 0 6 8
Equ 4 4 4 12
Society 2
Type 1 2 3

















SI1 2 0 0 2
SI2 0 2 0 2
SI3 0 0 2 2
Eff 0 0 0 0
AV2
SI1 2 0 0 2
SI2 0 2 2 4
SI3 0 0 1 1
Eff 2 2 0 4
AV3
SI1 2 2 2 6
SI2 0 2 2 4
SI3 2 0 2 4
Eff 2 2 0 4
BC
SI1 6 2 2 10
SI2 0 6 4 10
SI3 2 0 6 8
Eff 4 4 0 8
Figure A.13: Predicted outcomes under sincere voting for Societies 1 and 2 in small
electorates.
Note: Outcomes are calculated under the assumption that subjects vote sincerely according to their
induced preferences. AV2 assumes that all voters approve of exactly two alternatives. AV3 assumes that
all voters approve of exactly three alternatives. Predicted winners are highlighted in boldface.
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Society 3
Type 1 2 3


















SI1 2 0 0 2
SI2 0 2 0 2
SI3 0 0 2 2
Equ 0 0 0 0
Eff 0 0 0 0
AV2
SI1 2 0 0 2
SI2 0 2 0 2
SI3 0 0 2 2
Equ 0 0 2 2
Eff 2 2 0 4
AV3
SI1 2 0 0 2
SI2 0 2 2 4
SI3 0 0 2 2
Equ 2 2 2 6
Eff 2 2 0 4
BC
SI1 8 2 2 12
SI2 0 8 4 12
SI3 2 0 8 10
Equ 4 4 6 14
Eff 6 6 0 12
Society 4
Type 1 2 3


















SI1 2 0 0 2
SI2 0 2 0 2
SI3 0 0 2 2
Equ 0 0 0 0
Eff 0 0 0 0
AV2
SI1 2 0 0 2
SI2 0 2 0 2
SI3 0 0 2 2
Equ 0 2 2 4
Eff 2 0 0 2
AV3
SI1 2 0 0 2
SI2 0 2 0 2
SI3 0 0 2 2
Equ 2 2 2 6
Eff 2 2 2 6
BC
SI1 8 2 0 10
SI2 0 8 2 10
SI3 2 0 8 10
Equ 4 6 6 16
Eff 6 4 4 14
Figure A.14: Predicted outcomes under sincere voting for Societies 3 and 4 in small
electorates.
Note: Outcomes are calculated under the assumption that subjects vote sincerely according to their
induced preferences. AV2 assumes that all voters approve of exactly two alternatives. AV3 assumes that
all voters approve of exactly three alternatives. Predicted winners are highlighted in boldface.
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Society 3
Type 1 2 3


















SI1 8 0 0 8
SI2 0 9 0 9
SI3 0 0 13 13
Equ 0 0 0 0
Eff 0 0 0 0
AV2
SI1 8 0 0 8
SI2 0 9 0 9
SI3 0 0 13 13
Equ 0 0 13 13
Eff 8 9 0 17
AV3
SI1 8 0 0 8
SI2 0 9 13 22
SI3 0 0 13 13
Equ 8 9 13 30
Eff 8 9 0 17
BC
SI1 32 9 13 41
SI2 0 36 26 62
SI3 8 0 52 60
Equ 16 18 39 73
Eff 24 27 0 51
Society 4
Type 1 2 3


















SI1 13 0 0 13
SI2 0 9 0 9
SI3 0 0 8 8
Equ 0 0 0 0
Eff 0 0 0 0
AV2
SI1 13 0 0 13
SI2 0 9 0 9
SI3 0 0 8 8
Equ 0 9 8 17
Eff 13 0 0 13
AV3
SI1 13 0 0 13
SI2 0 9 0 9
SI3 0 0 8 8
Equ 13 9 8 30
Eff 13 9 8 30
BC
SI1 42 9 0 51
SI2 0 36 8 44
SI3 13 0 32 45
Equ 26 27 24 77
Eff 39 18 16 73
Figure A.15: Predicted outcomes under sincere voting for Societies 3 and 4 in HET.
Notes: Outcomes are calculated under the assumption that subjects vote sincerely according to
their induced preferences. AV2 assumes that all voters approve of exactly two alternatives. AV3
assumes that all voters approve of exactly three alternatives. Predicted winners are highlighted
in boldface.
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